



# **Southern California Edison**

## **Wildfire Response Plan**

**Prepared by:**  
**Business Resiliency**  
**Version 1.6**  
**October 1, 2018**

**Plan Technical Specialist:**  
**Business Resiliency Duty Manager (BRDM)**

## Table of Contents

<b>PURPOSE .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>PLAN ACRONYMS.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>DRIVERS AND ASSUMPTIONS.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>SCENARIOS AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>OBJECTIVES.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO WILDFIRES .....</b>	<b>7</b>
EDUCATION AND OUTREACH .....	7
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RULES AND REGULATIONS .....	8
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS .....	8
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE AND NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE DEFINITIONS.....	9
PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUT-OFF PROTOCOL .....	10
POST WILDFIRE DEBRIS-FLOW ASSESSMENT.....	11
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE.....	11
<b>CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>13</b>
PHASE 1B: INCREASED LIKELIHOOD (7-4 DAYS PRIOR TO WEATHER EVENT).....	14
PHASE 1C: CREDIBLE THREAT (3 DAYS PRIOR TO WEATHER EVENT) .....	16
PHASE 2A: ACTIVATION (2 DAYS PRIOR TO WEATHER EVENT).....	19
PHASE 2B: INITIAL RESPONSE (1 DAY PRIOR TO WEATHER EVENT).....	22
PHASE 2C: SUSTAINED RESPONSE (0-END OF EVENT) .....	25
PHASE 3A: RECOVERY (DEMOBILIZATION-END OF WEATHER EVENT).....	30

## PURPOSE

The ***Southern California Edison (SCE) Wildfire Response Plan*** outlines a threat specific strategy aimed at mitigating, planning for, responding to and recovering from a wildfire incident with the potential of significant damage to SCE infrastructure and loss of electrical services to customers. Based on scenarios most likely to occur, it is intended to function as an annex to the SCE All-Hazards plan and guide how SCE will monitor a potential event and coordinate critical preparedness, response and recovery operations during and after a wildfire within its service territory. Users of the plan are expected to apply their training and expertise to assess for appropriate actions and adapt such actions as necessary for the circumstances of each incident. The plan outlines the roles and responsibilities for the company leadership and incident response personnel across the enterprise.

## PLAN ACRONYMS

AREP-Agency Representatives

CMC-Crisis Management Council

HFRA-High Fire Risk Area

ICS-Incident Command System

ICT-Incident Communications Team

IMT-Incident Management Team

IST-Incident Support Team

LNO-Liaison Officer

MBL-Medical Baseline

PSPS-Public Safety Power Shut-Off

SCE-Southern California Edison

TSP-Technical Specialist

## DRIVERS AND ASSUMPTIONS

SCE is actively engaged in managing potential wildfire impacts within its service territory by mitigating risks posed by SCE infrastructure, restoring damaged critical infrastructure and effectively maintaining reliable power supply to customers. To help accomplish this, SCE uses a multitude of resources to forecast the extent and impact of weather conditions that could increase the risk for potential wildfires. Forecasts can suddenly change and plans must be flexible in order to adapt to shifting conditions. Therefore, SCE continuously evaluates efforts during real-world events to ensure assets are utilized in the most efficient way to meet the needs of our customers. This plan is designed to operate with other operational and response plans throughout SCE.

Specific drivers and assumptions for wildfire events include:

- National Weather Service Watches and/or Warnings for fire weather and wind in the High Fire Hazard Areas (HFRA) of SCE's service territory will be monitored for possible response operations
- Equipment and personnel to manage wildfire operations may be pre-staged as appropriate based on monitored weather forecasts
- The use of a Public Safety Power Shut-Off (PSPS) protocol to de-energize circuits in HFRA that pose a risk to public safety may be used as part of incident operations
- SCE will use its best efforts to provide notifications regarding the use of the PSPS protocol to potentially impacted customers and external partner agencies with consideration of impacts to critical care customers, local firefighting operations and evacuation routes
- Rain storms can produce debris flows in certain areas affected by wildfires. Special analysis and mitigation procedures for SCE infrastructure will be used to perform targeted mitigation and response operations as appropriate.

## SCENARIOS AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS

SCE will base mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery operations related to wildfires based on the following scenarios and potential impacts:

SCENARIOS
<b>Scenario #1-Threat of Wildfire</b> Extreme fire weather is forecasted or occurring and mitigation measures are implemented to reduce the risk of wildfire ignition from SCE infrastructure and facilities
<b>Scenario #2-Confirmed Wildfire</b> A significant fire or several fires burning simultaneously in the service area that have an effect on public safety, SCE facilities, employees and infrastructure or result in power outages to customers
<b>Scenario #3-Threat of Debris Flows</b> A wildfire has occurred in the service territory and heavy rain storms threaten possible debris flows in certain areas affected by fire
POTENTIAL IMPACTS
SCE facilities as a potential contributor to creating a hazardous condition
Service outages that may pose a life safety risk to critical care customers or essential services
Affects to SCE facilities and employees
Limited access to damaged infrastructure, facilities and employees
Damage to critical dependencies such as gas, water, oil and telecommunications
Possible hazardous materials release

## OBJECTIVES

The following objectives for incident management during a wildfire have been identified:

- Consider the safety of customers, employees, contractors, and first responders
- Conduct safe and efficient restoration of critical electric infrastructure
- Monitor conditions within the service territory and the need for potential mitigation activities
- Monitor the need to use the Public Safety Power Shut-Off (PSPS) protocol
- Consider input from local governments and public safety agencies regarding impacts related to de-energizing of circuits
- Make attempts to notify customers of potential outages and provide on-going outage updates
- Communicate effectively with internal and external stakeholders (employees, customers, general public, public officials)
- Evaluate the ongoing risk of a secondary incident from heavy rain
- Comply with regulatory requirements
- Consider impacts to the environment

## SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO WILDFIRES

### Education and Outreach

Wildfires pose a significant risk to SCE infrastructure. Therefore, education and outreach to both internal and external stakeholders regarding the effects of wildfire helps minimize potential impacts to communities and SCE operations. SCE actively engages in education and outreach programs to communities and customers as outlined below.

*General Outreach* - SCE maintains public information regarding outages on SCE.com and will be incorporating a regular, ongoing Public Safety Power Shut-Off (PSPS) messaging strategy to existing public information programs as appropriate.

*Critical Care Customers* - Critical Care customers are the customers most vulnerable of those enrolled in SCE's Medical Baseline (MBL) program. Out of the approximately 93,000 Medical Baseline customers, roughly 16,000 are identified as Critical Care.

SCE cannot guarantee an uninterrupted supply of energy, and encourages customers to have back-up power and/or a plan to safeguard their health and welfare when power outages occur. Because back-up power is not a requirement in order to receive MBL allocation, SCE does not know how many customers have a back-up power supply available. It is critical these customers prepare for times when the power is out so they remain resilient and safe in those situations. Additionally, it is important that we verify contact information regularly to maintain accurate customer lists. This plan includes notification strategies for communicating with customers.

*Essential Use Customers* - Essential Use customers are non-residential customers that provide an essential public health, safety, and/or security service to the public. Those customers may be exempt or non-exempt from Rotating Outages.

*Essential Use-Exempt Customers* - Essential use customers must qualify within one of the 13 CPUC-established categories. SCE requires documentation to validate an exemption from rotating outages for all service accounts. Such information may include state license information for hospitals and skilled nursing facilities, transmitter call signs for communication utilities, and information regarding the sufficiency of standby generation where applicable. Consistent with D.02-04-060, all hospitals and licensed skilled nursing facilities are exempt without the assessment of backup generation. All exempt essential use customer accounts are reviewed on an annual basis to confirm their eligibility for exemption from Rotating Outages.

*Essential Use-Nonexempt Customers* - Essential use, nonexempt customers are those that meet the criteria for the Essential Use Program, but are subject to rotating outages, primarily because such customers have adequate backup generation. Customers who can sustain their critical operations for at least one hour are not routinely protected from rotating outages per D.82-06-021, "this double protection may be jeopardizing other equally essential use customers at the higher load reduction levels." Essential use-nonexempt customers receive an annual reminder advising them to confirm the adequacy of their backup generation and to notify SCE if it is no longer able to support their critical load for at least one hour.

*Local Governments and Public Safety Agencies* – SCE regularly maintains open lines of communication with local governments and public safety agencies during normal operations to increase coordination and collaboration between agencies when emergencies occur. In addition to routine interactions with customer service, interactions include, but are not limited to, interfacing with SCE’s local public affairs, fire management and business resiliency subject matter experts as outlined below.

During times of response, SCE staff may serve in the affected jurisdiction’s Incident Command System. These staff act as the liaison between SCE’s Incident Management teams and the affected community. These representatives work to identify outages, real and potential issues associated with those outages, and information requests regarding restoration. This relationship allows for increased situational awareness to make informed decisions regarding evacuations, fire-fighting operations and critical restoration times for essential use facilities.

SCE also utilizes specialized Fire Management staff to monitor, respond to and report on all fires affecting or having the potential to affect SCE infrastructure. These personnel represent SCE during fire incidents, typically by serving as a cooperator in the field fire incident management structure. They coordinate SCE’s response to fires by providing information to manage the bulk electric system, repair damage, restore the electric system, and/or safe access to begin restoration work. These personnel maintain close working relationships with fire and emergency management agencies throughout the service territory and serve as a consultant and subject matter expert on fire risk management. They provide actionable and timely information to Grid Operations, Transmission & Distribution, Power Production, Air Operations, Claims, and the Watch Office. They also enhance first responder safety by developing and delivering Electrical Safety for First Responders Awareness Training.

Business resiliency staff are responsible for the creation, implementation, and maintenance, training and testing of SCE’s emergency plans. Staff work to create relationships with local governments, public safety agencies and other community stakeholders.

#### Securities and Exchange Commission Rules and Regulations

While the safety of SCE’s employees and customers is the first priority during emergency response, there are also communications with our investors that may be necessary during times of emergency. SCE will comply with all required Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and New York Stock Exchange rules and regulations for maintaining appropriate contact with investors.

#### Situational Awareness

Coordinated response relies heavily on comprehensive situational awareness, and wildfire operations require the most up to date situational awareness available. Therefore, SCE will use in-house meteorologist staff, data analytics and geospatial tools to create tailored weather service products using field based weather station information and modeling to inform operational decision-making, including:

- Long-range severe weather modeling that will inform mitigation investments
- Short-term reports in advance of storms and anticipated high fire weather days
- Daily updates in the days leading up to and during a significant event that focuses on weather, potential fire areas and impacts to SCE infrastructure and customers

- Specialized reports that outline thresholds for activation of the Public Safety Power Shut-Off (PSPS) protocol

#### National Weather Service and National Forest Service Definitions

SCE will use the following definitions from the National Weather Service (NWS) and National Forest Service (NFS) in conjunction with internal meteorologists to provide additional context and external validation of predicted weather. These standard timelines may be adapted at the local level based on weather criteria and mitigation, planning and response needs.

#### **High Wind Warning**

Winds are sustained at 40mph or more, and/or gusts are present at 58mph or more and are expected in less than one day (24 hours).

#### **High Wind Watch**

Winds are sustained at 40mph or more, and/or gusts are present at 58mph or more and are expected in more than one day (25+ hours).

#### **Red Flag Warning**

NWS issues a Red Flag Warning, in conjunction with land management agencies, to alert land managers to an ongoing or imminent critical fire weather pattern. NWS issues a Red Flag Warning when fire conditions are ongoing or expected to occur within the next 24 hours.

#### **Fire Weather Watch:**

A Fire Weather Watch alerts land managers that upcoming weather conditions could result in critical fire weather conditions, which are expected to develop in the next 12 to 48 hours, but not more than 72 hours. In cases of dry lightning, a Fire Weather Watch may be issued for the next 12 hours.

#### **Extreme Fire Weather:**

Upon ignition, fires may have extreme growth, may burn very intensely, and could be uncontrollable.

## Public Safety Power Shut-Off Protocol

***The following protocol is meant to summarize considerations leading to the implementation of a PSPS protocol. Given the tradeoffs inherent in a decision to preemptively shutoff power, and the complex nature of events and potential existence of other factors not included in the attached, execution of the PSPS protocol is ultimately based on the judgment of the Incident Management Team (IMT) and the protocol that follows is intended to provide a framework to assist the IMT in exercising this discretion.***

SCE employs guidelines to proactively de-energize circuits within HFRAs if data sources indicate that extreme local weather conditions pose an imminent and significant threat to public safety. The significant variability of weather and environmental conditions across the service territory, coupled with the effects of climate change and the State's severe drought/bark beetle issues, demand flexible de-energization guidelines that can be used under a variety of circumstances and electrical system operating conditions. SCE's protocol, officially titled Public Safety Power Shut-Off (PSPS), consists of a set of criteria and guidelines with a wide variety of factors to be considered for appropriate use.

## PSPS Task-Force

Execution of the PSPS protocol is overseen by a specialized Task Force in the Incident Command Structure under the Operations Section Chief that includes representatives from key stakeholders to manage the necessary public safety notifications to critical care, essential use, business customers and local governments potentially affected by its use. The Task-Force is responsible for monitoring and considering conditions and relevant information before recommending the de-energization of any SCE circuit(s). Considerations may include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Red Flag Warnings issued by the NWS for fire weather zones that contain SCE circuits in HFRAs
- Ongoing assessments from the SCE in-house meteorologists of local conditions including wind speed (sustained and gust), humidity and temperature, fuel moisture, fuel loading and data from weather stations
- Real-time situational awareness information from personnel positioned locally in HFRAs identified as at risk of being subject to extreme weather conditions
- Input from SCE Fire Management experts
- Input from SCE's Vegetation Management as appropriate
- Input regarding specific concerns from local and state fire authorities regarding the potential consequences of power outage and wildfires in select locations
- Alternative ways to reroute power to affected areas
- Awareness of mandatory or voluntary evacuation orders in place
- Expected impact of de-energizing circuits on essential services
- Other operational considerations to minimize potential wildfire ignitions, including the blocking of re-closers on the identified circuit(s)
- On-going fire activity throughout SCE territory and California
- Progress of customer notification processes
- Ongoing notifications to local governments and public officials
- Potential impacts to communities and customers

As conditions improve and circuit patrols have been performed in the field, SCE will begin to restore power depending on local conditions at the time. The order in which circuits are re-energized will depend on many factors such as damage, repair time, customer well-being and affected essential services.

#### Post Wildfire Debris-Flow Assessment

As determined necessary, SCE may conduct the following post-wildfire debris-flow assessment to identify and safeguard any SCE assets in high-risk debris-flow areas.

**Identify SCE assets in high-risk debris-flow areas** - The post-wildfire debris-flow assessment framework uses USGS modeling to identify areas of high debris-flow risk. Buffer analysis is then conducted to identify if any substation, transmission, sub-transmission, distribution and telecom assets that could be potentially impacted. These assets will be identified immediately after a fire and as soon as the USGS has updated its models in new post-fire areas. Mitigations options will be determined based on the results. SCE does not assess or identify impacts to the community or non-SCE assets.

**Identify and monitor rainfall indicators that could trigger debris flow** – Predicted rainfall data, including total rainfall and rainfall intensity, for identified areas of concern will be monitored. These indicators are only available for areas where the assets are believed to be at risk of damage due to debris flow which are site specific.

#### California Public Utilities Commission Regulation and Compliance

##### ***ESRB-8-Resolution Extending De-Energization Reasonableness, Notification, Mitigation and Reporting Requirements In Decision 12-04-024 To All Electric Investor Owned Utilities***

Commission Decision (D.) 12-04-024 established requirements for reasonableness, notification, mitigation and reporting by San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) for its de-energization events. This resolution extends the requirements established in D.12-04-024 to all electric IOUs, requires that the utilities meet with the local communities that may be impacted by a future de-energization event before putting the practice in effect in a particular area, requires feasible and appropriate customer notifications prior to a de-energization event, and requires notification to the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) as soon as practicable after a decision to de-energize facilities and within 12 hours after the last service is restored.

California Public Utilities Code (PU Code) Sections 451 and 399.2(a) give electric utilities authority to shut off electric power in order to protect public safety. This authority includes shutting off power for the prevention of fires caused by strong winds. Application (A.) 08-12-021 filed by SDG&E on December 22, 2008, requested specific authority to shut off power as a fire-prevention measure against severe Santa Ana winds and a review of SDG&E's proactive de-energization measures. SDG&E also requested that such power shut-offs would qualify for an exemption from liability under SDG&E's Tariff Rule 14. Decision (D.) 12-04-024 issued on April 19, 2012 provided guidance on SDG&E's authority to shut off power under the PU Code and also established factors the Commission may consider in determining whether or not a decision by SDG&E to shut off power was reasonable. The decision ruled that SDG&E has the authority under Public Utilities Code, Sections 451 and 399.2(a) to shut off power in emergency situations when necessary to protect public safety. It also ruled that a decision to shut off power by

SDG&E under its statutory authority, including the adequacy of any notice given and any mitigation measures implemented, may be reviewed by the Commission to determine if SDG&E's actions were reasonable. The decision requires SDG&E to take appropriate and feasible steps to provide notice and mitigation to its customers whenever it shuts off power. The decision also requires SDG&E to notify the Commission's Consumer Protection and Safety Division, now the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED), of the shut-off within 12 hours and submit a report to SED with a detailed explanation of its decision to shut off the power.

ESRB-8 extends the de-energization reasonableness, public notification, mitigation and reporting requirements in D. 12-04-024 to all electric investor owned utilities and adds additional requirements. It also places a requirement on these utilities to make all feasible and appropriate attempts to notify customers of a de-energization event prior to performing de-energization. This plan addresses Southern California Edison's new regulatory requirements under ESRB-8.

## CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

SCE will utilize the following phased approach as the foundation for wildfire incident management:

### Emergency Management Phases

Pre-Incident			Response			Recovery
1A	1B	1C	2A	2B	2C	3A
Normal Operation	Increased Likelihood	Credible Threat	Activation	Initial Response	Sustained Response	Long-term Recovery

#### Phase 1A: Normal Operations

Outlines the mitigation and preparedness programs regularly practiced throughout the organization. Phase 1A is ongoing and informed by risk assessment and identified mitigation needs.

#### Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood

Outlines the indicators and actions taken leading up to a potential event, with a focus on gathering initial situational awareness, and ends once the threat has been alleviated or the threat is deemed credible.

#### Phase 1C: Credible Threat

Outlines the indicator actions taken immediately before an event, with a focus on activating personnel and gathering initial situational awareness, and ends once an Incident Management Team (IMT) has been activated or the threat has been alleviated.

#### Phase 2A: Activation

Outlines the actions taken during the beginning an event, with a focus on activating personnel and gathering initial situational awareness, and ends once Incident Command establishes operational control over the incident.

#### Phase 2B: Initial Response

Details the actions of the IMT in the early response operation, focusing on situational awareness and establishing a regular response cycle allowing all teams to coordinate effectively.

#### Phase 2C: Sustained Response

Outlines the continuing activities of the IMT once operational control, a regular operational cycle and situational awareness have been established.

#### Phase 3A: Recovery

Outlines the activities of key personnel following the end of an event. This includes analysis of an affected area to determine the potential for hazards, identifying indicators to inform mitigation and preemptive measures, and developing a schedule for continued monitoring for post-incident hazards.

### Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood (7-4 Days Prior to Weather Event)

#### Indicators:

- 7-4 day weather outlook with the following conditions:
  - Predicted Fire Weather (high wind and low relative humidity)

#### Critical Information Requirements:

- Meteorology Data
  - 7-4 Day weather outlook
- Identification of possible at-risk PSPS circuits based on predicted Fire Weather
- Storm Damage Modeling

#### End-State Conditions for Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood:

- The Business Resiliency Duty Manager (BRDM) with input from subject matter experts and the complexity analysis has determined a credible threat exists and further actions are necessary (***move to Phase 1C: Credible Threat***)  
    **~~OR~~**
- The BRDM, with input from subject matter experts makes a determination that no credible threat exists and no further actions are necessary

#### Special Considerations for Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood Execution Checklist

- The National Weather Service may issue Red Flag Warnings and Wind speeds that DO NOT meet or exceed weather thresholds in any area. The BRDM may elect to remain in this stage and suspend or take no further actions pending future forecasts
- Internal coordination conference calls begin in this phase

Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides 7-4 day weather outlook <input type="checkbox"/> Runs predictive weather models for potential threat to infrastructure <input type="checkbox"/> Forwards information to the Watch Office
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Includes forecasted weather in the Daily Report <input type="checkbox"/> Sends e-mail with High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) Report to WO HFRA Report distribution list <input type="checkbox"/> Initiates Coordination Conference Call <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Coordination conference call details:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conference #: ██████████</li> <li>▪ Passcode: ██████████</li> <li>▪ Attendees:                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Business Resiliency Duty Manager (BRDM)</li> <li>• Grid Operations Director</li> <li>• On-Duty Grid Ops Branch Director</li> <li>• Meteorology</li> <li>• Fire Management</li> <li>• On-Duty IST IC Lead</li> <li>• On-Duty ES IMT IC Lead</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Agenda:                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology updates</li> <li>• IST/IMT alert/activation considerations</li> <li>• Next call timeframe</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Conducts coordination conference call 1x daily

Phase 1C: Credible Threat (3 Days Prior to Weather Event)

<b>Indicators:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3-day weather outlook with the following conditions:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ High Wind Watch/Warning or Fire Weather Watch forecasted in the High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Start of Extreme Fire Weather is forecasted for 72 hours or less</li> </ul>
<b>Critical Information Requirements:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology Data           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 3 Day Outlook</li> <li>○ Districts potentially impacted by predicted weather</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Identification of possible at-risk PSPS circuits based on predicted weather</li> <li>• Storm Damage Modeling</li> <li>• Status of any current fire(s) burning in or toward the service territory</li> <li>• Identification of available field resources</li> <li>• Status of the bulk power system and any constraints</li> <li>• Status of ISO warnings/alerts</li> </ul>
<b>End-State Conditions for Phase 1C: Credible Threat:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The BRDM with input from subject matter experts and the complexity analysis has determined activation of the Incident Command System is necessary (<b><i>move to Phase 2A: Activation</i></b>)                <b>~~OR~~</b></li> <li>• The BRDM with input from subject matter experts makes a determination that no activation of the Incident Command System is necessary (<b><i>return to Phase 1B: Increased Likelihood</i></b>)</li> </ul>
<b>Special Considerations for Phase 1C: Credible Threat Execution Checklist:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IST/IMT placed on alert in this phase</li> <li>• Internal identification of possible affected PSPS circuits begins in this phase</li> <li>• Internal identification of possible affected local governments, public safety agencies and customers begins in this phase</li> <li>• SCE representatives will make every attempt to make contact with affected local governments and public safety agencies to alert them of the identification of a possible PSPS circuit within their jurisdiction as described in the following execution checklists.</li> </ul>

Phase 1C: Credible Threat Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides 3-day weather outlook <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ If there is a High Fire Risk and wind speeds forecasted to exceed local PSPS Thresholds in any District, run High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) report 1x daily</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Runs HFRA Report and sends to Watch Office 1x daily
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Sends e-mail with HFRA Report to WO HFRA Report distribution list <input type="checkbox"/> Initiates Coordination Conference Call <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Coordination conference call details:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Conference #: [REDACTED]</li> <li>▪ Passcode: [REDACTED]</li> <li>▪ Attendees:                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Business Resiliency Duty Manager (BRDM)</li> <li>• On-Duty IST IC Lead</li> <li>• On-Duty ES IMT IC Lead</li> <li>• Grid Operations Director</li> <li>• Grid Operations Storm Manager</li> <li>• On-Duty Grid Ops Branch Director</li> <li>• DC&amp;M Distribution Programs &amp; Strategy Principal Manager</li> <li>• Meteorology</li> <li>• Fire Management</li> <li>• Business Customer Division</li> <li>• Consumer Affairs</li> <li>• Local Public Affairs/Government Affairs</li> <li>• Corporate Communications</li> <li>• Call Center Operations</li> <li>• Claims</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Agenda:                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology updates</li> <li>• Status of the bulk power system</li> <li>• Status of any active fires</li> <li>• Districts/circuits affected</li> <li>• IST/IMT alert/activation considerations                       <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ PSPS Task-Force member identification</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Next call timeframe</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Alerts IST/IMT for possible activation <input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Conducts coordination conference call 1x daily <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates the need to put IST/IMT on alert/activation
<b>On-Duty Grid Ops Branch Director</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Participates in coordination conference calls <input type="checkbox"/> Identifies field resources to be deployed for possible on-site PSPS circuit monitoring
<b>Grid Operations Storm Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Initiates Resource Planning and Performance Manager (RPPM) call to identify and coordinate field resources <input type="checkbox"/> Validates internal resources for possible on-site PSPS circuit monitoring <input type="checkbox"/> Reviews scheduled maintenance outages and all planned and emergent field work in anticipation of Red Flag Conditions

Phase 1C: Credible Threat Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Local Public Affairs</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Compiles list of local government and public safety stakeholders based on list of potentially affected circuits <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies PA IMT List <input type="checkbox"/> Provides updates to Sacramento/San Francisco/Washington D.C.
<b>Corp. Comm.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides appropriate broad corporate messaging to ICT distribution list
<b>Customer Service</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides situational awareness to internal BCD account managers <input type="checkbox"/> Compiles prioritized lists of possible affected customers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Critical Care/Essential/Business/Residential</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Compiles list of potentially affected cities and counties and provides to LPA and Watch Office <input type="checkbox"/> Prepares for additional call center staffing as needed

Phase 2A: Activation (2 Days Prior to Weather Event)

<b>Indicators:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extreme Fire Weather conditions expected</li> <li>• National Weather Service Red Flag Warning likely issued in 24-48 hours</li> <li>• Fire(s) are actively burning in or near the service territory</li> <li>• IST/IMT resources are activated and additional teams are placed on standby for sustained response</li> </ul>
<b>Critical Information Requirements:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology Data             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 2-day outlook</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Identification of possible at risk PSPS circuits based on predicted weather</li> <li>• Storm Damage Modeling</li> <li>• Status of any current fire(s) burning in or toward the service territory</li> <li>• Status of available field resources</li> <li>• Status of the bulk power system and any constraints</li> <li>• Status of any ISO warnings/alerts</li> </ul>
<b>End-State Conditions for Phase 2A: Activation:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The BRDM, with input from subject matter experts and the incident complexity analysis, determines an activation is warranted under the current conditions</li> <li>• Incident Command personnel is activated, deployed, and responding under the Incident Command System</li> <li>• Initial safety concerns have been assessed and protective actions are being implemented as appropriate</li> <li>• Requests from field resources for support personnel have been conducted (<b><i>move to Phase 2B: Initial Response</i></b>)</li>   <li style="text-align: center;">~~OR~~</li>   <li>• The BRDM, with input from subject matter experts as needed, makes a determination that the threat to SCE has lessened and activation of teams is no longer necessary (<b><i>move back to Phase 1C: Credible Threat</i></b>)</li> </ul>
<b>Special Considerations for Phase 2A: Activation Execution Checklist:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public Safety Power Shut-Off Task Force (Grid Operations, Customer Service, Local Government Affairs, District Representatives) activated in this phase</li> <li>• Activation of the CMC to a Tier II 24 hours before predicted weather event begins at the end of this phase</li> <li>• Securities and Exchange Commission and public information considerations begin in this phase and may require input and/or approval of the CMC on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the event</li> <li>• Local Government, public safety and customer notifications regarding the possible use of the PSPS protocol begin in this phase</li> <li>• Consider input regarding the potential impacts of de-energization of circuits within their areas of responsibility as appropriate from:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Municipal Fire/Law Enforcement/Emergency Management</li> <li>○ State Fire/Law Enforcement/Emergency Management</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Phase 2A: Activation Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Runs HFRA Report and sends to Watch Office 1x daily
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Arranges IST briefing to include Critical Information requirements by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Meteorology</li> <li>○ BRDM</li> <li>○ Fire Management</li> <li>○ Grid Ops</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Reports all active fires in the service territory to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ BRDM</li> <li>○ On-duty IST/IMT</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Includes status updates in the Daily Report <input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Activates IST/IMT <input type="checkbox"/> Briefs the IST IC on the current situation and prepares initial briefing for ES IMT <input type="checkbox"/> Works with IST/IMC lead to notify CMC members of event and provide initial situational updates
<b>IST Incident Commander (Lead IC)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Establishes a briefing schedule for the CMC and a CMC communications plan <input type="checkbox"/> Prepares information for CMC briefing based on PSPS Task-Force reporting <input type="checkbox"/> Puts mitigation strategies in place for potential public safety concerns and at risk customers <input type="checkbox"/> At risk circuits along with specific threshold considerations for triggering PSPS Protocol pre-approved by Grid Operations Director and TS&O VP (escalate to T&D SVP if unavailable)
<b>ES IMT Incident Commander (Deputy IC)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Informs the IST of incident status <input type="checkbox"/> Actively manages the incident <input type="checkbox"/> Works with Operations Section to determine resource requirements
<b>Claims Tech. Spec</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Gather, prioritize and report all identified claims to the Operations Section Chief
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Two hours before public messaging starts performs the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Notifies PA IMT list</li> <li>○ Sends Local Government and public safety notifications to affected cities/counties</li> <li>○ Directs AREPS to solicit input and follow up with local government and public safety agencies for feedback to the LNO</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Provides updates to Sacramento/San Francisco/Washington DC <input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to the PSPS Task Force
<b>Public Information Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with IMT member to determine outage, restoration, and public safety information as well as any other relevant information <input type="checkbox"/> Drafts related PSPS messaging <input type="checkbox"/> Clears PSPS messaging through IST and CMC leadership <input type="checkbox"/> Distributes messaging to the incident communication team for delivery to stakeholders

Phase 2A: Activation Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<b>On-Duty Grid Operations Branch Director</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides situational awareness to incoming Operations Section Chief
<b>Operations Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides situational awareness to the ES IMT Incident Commander <input type="checkbox"/> Establishes a PSPS Task Force Lead to include representatives from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Customer Service</li> <li>○ Grid Operations</li> <li>○ Local Public Affairs</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Works with PSPS Task Force to determine resource requirements <input type="checkbox"/> Develops recommendation for discontinuing planned and emergent field work based on weather forecasts
<b>PSPS Task Force (Grid Ops Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides considerations regarding identified at risk PSPS circuits to the Operations Section Chief <input type="checkbox"/> Identifies resources necessary for monitoring identified at-risk PSPS circuits
<b>Planning Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Works with the Resource Unit Leader to secure resources to manage the incident as identified by the Operations Section Chief
<b>Customer Service Tech Spec.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates of affected customers to the PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Begins notifications to affected customers

Phase 2B: Initial Response (1 Day Prior to Weather Event)

<b>Indicators:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IST/IMT activated and operating at the Emergency Operations Center</li> <li>• CMC activated to a Tier II</li> <li>• Customer, local government and public safety agency notifications and coordination are being conducted</li> </ul>
<b>Critical Information Requirements:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology data           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current outlook</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Ongoing identification of possible at-risk PSPS circuits based on predicted weather</li> <li>• Storm Damage Modeling</li> <li>• Status of any current fire(s) burning in or toward the service territory</li> <li>• Status of available field resources</li> <li>• Status of the bulk power system and any constraints</li> <li>• Status of any ISO warnings/alerts</li> </ul>
<b>End-State Conditions for Phase 2B: Initial Response:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communication established between IST, IMT and field teams</li> <li>• Resource requirements have been reviewed and support has been requested</li> <li>• SCE Agency representatives are communicating with affected local governments, public safety agencies and customers, gathering situational awareness and prioritizing restoration requests</li> </ul>
<b>Special Considerations for Phase 2B: Initial Response Execution Checklist:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The IC should confirm all of the following criteria have been met before pro-active de-energization of the circuit, circuits, or portions of circuits in that area is <b>CONSIDERED</b>.           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ National Weather Service has issued a Red Flag Warning</li> <li>○ SCE has determined that extreme fire weather is occurring and high winds may cause any fire to spread rapidly</li> <li>○ PSPS Circuits have been matched with areas of Red Flag and damaging winds</li> </ul> </li> <li>• When CMC is activated, the Delegation of Authority should consider the need for approval on Public Information messages</li> <li>• Ongoing local government, public safety agency and customer notifications regarding de-energization occur in this phase. As confidence improves on forecasted conditions, possible circuits affected by a de-energization event may be refined and could lead to additional, more targeted notifications as appropriate</li> </ul>

Phase 2B: Initial Response Execution Checklist	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Runs HFRA Report as requested by the IST
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Includes status updates in the Daily Report <input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Arranges, prepares for and conducts the CMC Conference call <input type="checkbox"/> Maintains communications with the IST IC
<b>CMC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates Public Information considerations that may require approval of the CMC on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the event
<b>IST Incident Commander (Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Works with the Operations Section Chief on identified at risk circuits for possible de-energization <input type="checkbox"/> Provides situational awareness to the BRDM
<b>Public Information Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with IST/IMT member to determine outage, restoration, and public safety information as well as any other relevant information <input type="checkbox"/> Drafts related PSPS messaging <input type="checkbox"/> Clears PSPS messaging through IMT and CMC leadership <input type="checkbox"/> Distributes messaging to the incident communication team for delivery to stakeholders
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Two hours before public messaging for this phase begins performs the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Notifies PA IMT List</li> <li>○ Sends local government and public safety agency notifications to affected cities/counties</li> <li>○ Directs AREPS to follow up with local government agencies for feedback to the LNO</li> <li>○ Coordinates with local government, public safety agencies and NGOs to mobilize SCE resources at community locations as appropriate in support of de-energization</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Provides updates to Sacramento/San Francisco/Washington, DC <input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to the PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Maintains communication and provides updates to cities/counties <input type="checkbox"/> Assign AREPS to County emergency management offices in affected areas as applicable <input type="checkbox"/> Ensures all public messaging is coordinated through the IMT and CMC by the PIO
<b>ES IMT Incident Commander (Deputy)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Monitors and observes all circuits per HFRA Report <input type="checkbox"/> Identifies most at-risk circuits for possible de-energization <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies the IST IC of circuits proposed to be de-energized
<b>Operations Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates and manages the PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies all affected Regions and Districts <input type="checkbox"/> Develops mitigation plan for impacts to customers <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates the need to discontinue all planned and emergent field work <input type="checkbox"/> Dispatches resources to “door-knock” at customer locations as necessary

Phase 2B: Initial Response Execution Checklist:	
Role	Responsibility
<p><b>PSPS Task Force (Grid Ops Lead)</b></p> <p><b>PSPS Task-Force Members include:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Grid Ops</b></li> <li>• <b>LGA/LPA</b></li> <li>• <b>Customer Service</b></li> <li>• <b>Claims as needed</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Validates at-risk circuits being monitored for upcoming PSPS activation</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Notifies GCC Transmission Dispatcher when field resources are deployed for PSPS monitoring activities and request to initiate section 5.2.2 of SOB 322 protocol</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Indicates to GCC Transmission Dispatcher which districts and circuits will be monitored for possible PSPS de-energization</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Establishes open conference call line with PSPS Task Force, Grid Control Center, affected Switching Centers, and field observers once field resources have been deployed and are in place</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Gathers all relevant information regarding affected circuits</li> </ul>
<p><b>Customer Service Tech Spec.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Maintains and manages master customer list for PSPS Task-Force</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> As directed by the IC, continues to initiate pre-scripted targeted warning messaging to potentially affected customers</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Arranges to call “non-deliverable” Critical Care Customers based on Load and Send system data</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Makes staffing adjustments in anticipation of high call volume</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Briefs Customer Call Center staff</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Updates IVR with pre-scripted/pre-event messages</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Initiates pre-scripted/targeted messaging to customers being de-energized</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Supports affected customers (considers generation to at-risk customers on a case-by-case basis, cooling/warming centers through local government and NGOs, community charging stations, etc.)</li> </ul>

## Phase 2C: Sustained Response (0-End of Event)

<b>Indicators</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IST/IMT have established a common operating picture and incident is managed until recovery begins</li> <li>• Recurring response cycle is being maintained</li> <li>• Resources are being integrated into response operations at the field level</li> <li>• Ongoing internal/external communications regarding event are being conducted</li> </ul>
<b>Critical Information Requirements</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology Data               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Current Outlook</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Ongoing identification of possible at-risk PSPS circuits based on predicted weather</li> <li>• Status of any de-energized circuits</li> <li>• Storm Damage Modeling</li> <li>• Status of any current fire(s) burning in or toward the service territory</li> <li>• Status of available field resources</li> <li>• Status of the bulk power system and any constraints</li> <li>• Status of any ISO warnings/alerts</li> <li>• IMT Availability</li> </ul>
<b>End-State Conditions for Phase 2C: Sustained Response</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Field operations concentrate on restoring normal services</li> </ul>
<b>Special Considerations for Phase 2C: Sustained Response Execution Checklist</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Phase 2C is distinguished by the inclusion of re-energization considerations and includes a separate checklist for de-energization and re-energization</li> <li>• Local government, public safety agency and customer notifications for de-energization and re-energization occur in this phase</li> <li>• Suspension of patrol on a de-energized line or line section during a PSPS event shall only be done with prior approval from the Incident Commander and should conform to valid business reasons:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Protection of life or property</li> <li>○ Imminent public safety hazard</li> <li>○ Emergency need of water pump capacity for fire protection or potential flooding</li> <li>○ Significant snow or rain that eliminates the possibility of fire</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Regulatory reporting requirements to the CPUC, Director of the Safety Enforcement Division are required in this phase as soon as practicable but no later than 12 hours of any executed de-energization</li> </ul>

Phase 2C: Sustained Response Execution Checklist (De-Energization)	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Runs HFRA Report as requested by the IST
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provide updates in the daily report <input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Arranges CMC Conference call
<b>IST Incident Commander (Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Makes the final decision to de-energize customers <input type="checkbox"/> Briefs the CMC on current situation
<b>IMT Incident Commander (Deputy)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommends circuits to be de-energized under PSPS to IST IC <input type="checkbox"/> Makes decision when extreme fire weather conditions have subsided below PSPS thresholds for cancellation of PSPS
<b>CMC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates Public Information considerations that may require approval of the CMC on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the event
<b>Operations Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Develops mitigation plan for impacts to customers <input type="checkbox"/> Dispatches field resources to “door-knock” at customer locations as determined by Customer Service Tech Specialist <input type="checkbox"/> Develops strategy to re-energize lines <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates the need to discontinue all planned and emergent field work
<b>PSPS Task Force (Grid Ops Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Maintains open conference call line with PPS Task Force, Grid Control Center, affected Switching Centers, and field observers <input type="checkbox"/> Monitors and observes all circuits per HFRA Report <input type="checkbox"/> Validates with deployed field resources current extreme fire weather conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Makes recommendation to Operations Section Chief once extreme fire weather condition thresholds have been met for circuit(s) to be de-energized <input type="checkbox"/> Receives approval from IST IC to de-energized circuit(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies GCC Transmission Dispatcher that observed extreme fire weather thresholds for a particular area have been met and request circuit(s) to be de-energized under section 5.2.3 of SOB 322 protocol <input type="checkbox"/> Continues to monitor for at risk PPS circuit(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Initiates the development of restoration plan(s) that include prioritization for PPS circuits that have been de-energized <input type="checkbox"/> Determines necessary resources to patrol and restore circuit(s) de-energized under PPS <input type="checkbox"/> Gathers relevant information regarding affected circuits <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies claims of de-energization specifics under ESRB-8
<b>Planning Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Works with the Resource Unit Leader to secure resources necessary to re-energize lines as identified by the Operations Section Chief

Phase 2C: Sustained Response Execution Checklist (De-Energization)	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Notifies PA IMT List</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sends local government and public safety agency notifications to affected cities/counties</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Directs AREPS to follow-up with local governments and public safety agencies for feedback to the LNO</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with local government, public safety agencies and NGOs to mobilize SCE resources at community locations as appropriate in support of de-energization</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to Sacramento/San Francisco/Washington, DC</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to the PSPS Task Force</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Maintains communication and provides updates to cities/counties</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Continues to review all public messaging for coordination through the IMT and CMC by the PIO</li> </ul>
<b>Public Information Officer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with IST/IMT to determine outage, restoration, and public safety information as well as any other relevant information</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Drafts related PSPS messaging as needed</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Clears PSPS messaging through IST/IMT leadership</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Distributes messaging to the Incident Communication Team for delivery to stakeholders</li> </ul>
<b>Customer Service Tech Spec.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Makes notifications to those customers that were de-energized</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Makes notifications to those customers that were not de-energized but were notified that they might be</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Contacts those de-energized customers Load and Send system identifies as not receiving notifications</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Provides list of critical care customers requiring a “door-knock” to Operations Section Chief</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Makes staffing adjustments in anticipation of high call volume</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Briefs Customer Call Center staff</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Updates IVR with pre-scripted/post-event messages</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Plans to support affected customers (considers generation to at risk customers, cooling/warming centers through local government and NGOs, community charging stations, etc.)</li> </ul>

Phase 2C: Sustained Response Execution Checklist (Re-Energization)	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Runs HFRA Report as requested by the IST
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides updates in the daily report <input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report
<b>Business Resiliency Duty Manager</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Arranges CMC Conference call
<b>CMC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluates Public Information considerations that may require approval of the CMC on a case by case basis depending on the circumstances of the event
<b>IST Incident Commander (Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Makes the final decision to re-energize customers based on information from the ES IMT IC <input type="checkbox"/> Briefs the CMC on current situation
<b>ES IMT Incident Commander (Deputy)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Makes decision when extreme fire weather conditions have subsided below PSPS thresholds to recommend cancellation of the PSPS protocol to the IST Lead IC <input type="checkbox"/> Provides approval to Operations Section Chief to start restoration efforts to re-energize circuit(s) affected during PSPS event as appropriate <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with Operations Section Chief and Task-Force Leader to determine circuits to be re-energized
<b>Operations Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Briefs IC that Extreme Fire Weather conditions have subsided below PSPS thresholds and recommends cancellation of PSPS <input type="checkbox"/> Receives approval to cancel PSPS monitoring and to start restoration efforts <input type="checkbox"/> Manages the PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies IC of ongoing re-energization of circuits by district <input type="checkbox"/> Considers use of aviation resources to conduct circuit patrols prior to re-energization
<b>PSPS Task Force (Grid Ops Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Briefs Operations Section Chief when observed Extreme Fire Weather conditions subside for possible PSPS Protocol cancellation <input type="checkbox"/> Receives approval to cancel PSPS for district(s) and continues to monitor if not all districts have been cancelled <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies GCC Transmission Dispatcher of PSPS cancellation by district(s) and circuit(s) that can be re-energized <input type="checkbox"/> Communicates restoration plan along with resource assignments to each Switching Center for restoration of de-energized circuit(s) under their jurisdiction. <input type="checkbox"/> Performs ongoing assessment of restoration plan to assure restoration progress <input type="checkbox"/> Monitors field crews to ensure notifications are created for issues found during restoration <input type="checkbox"/> Captures All Load Up (ALU) times for each PSPS de-energized circuit from the affected Switching Center <input type="checkbox"/> Gathers information on affected circuits and verify that all circuits are ready for re-energization (patrol status, repair status, etc.)

Phase 2C: Sustained Response Execution Checklist (Re-Energization)	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Planning Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Works with the Resource Unit Leader to identify ongoing resource needs and to identify resources that are no longer needed after re-energization is complete
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to Sacramento/San Francisco/Washington, DC <input type="checkbox"/> Provides ongoing updates to the PSPS Task Force <input type="checkbox"/> Continues to review all public messaging for coordination through the IMT and CMC by the PIO <input type="checkbox"/> Informs local governments and public safety agencies of re-energization
<b>Public Information Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with IST/IMT member to determine outage, restoration, and public safety information as well as any other relevant information <input type="checkbox"/> Drafts related PSPS messaging as needed <input type="checkbox"/> Clears PSPS messaging through IST/IMT and CMC leadership <input type="checkbox"/> Distributes messaging to the Incident Communication Team for delivery to all stakeholders
<b>Customer Service Tech Spec.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Makes notifications to re-energized customers <input type="checkbox"/> Make staffing adjustments in anticipation of high call volume <input type="checkbox"/> Briefs Customer Call Center staff <input type="checkbox"/> Updates IVR with pre-scripted/post-event messages <input type="checkbox"/> Continues to evaluate support to affected customers

Phase 3A: Recovery (Demobilization-End of Weather Event)

<b>Indicators</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extreme Fire Weather has subsided and damaging high winds are below thresholds in all High Fire Risk Areas</li> <li>• Observations and/or monitoring in the field reports no imminent threats and forecasts indicate that extreme and damaging conditions have passed</li> </ul>
<b>Critical Information Requirements</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meteorology Data               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 3-day outlook</li> <li>○ High Fire Risk Areas Report</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Status of circuits and repairs</li> <li>• Maps of any burn scar areas</li> <li>• Debris Flow modeling as appropriate</li> </ul>
<b>End-State Conditions for moving to Phase 3A: Recovery</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operations transition to a Logistics Team or to the District level</li> <li>• PSPS circuits have been patrolled and re-energized</li> <li>• IST/IMT resources are/or will be demobilized</li> </ul>
<b>Special Considerations</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demobilization (DEMOB) criteria may be met and a National Weather Service Red Flag Warning may still be in effect.</li> <li>• Debris flow modeling for burn scar areas begins in this phase if appropriate</li> <li>• Claims considerations gathered, prioritized and reported to the CMC</li> <li>• Regulatory reporting requirements to the CPUC, Director of the Safety Enforcement Division detailing the requirements in CPUC Resolution ESRB-8 (Plan Attachment) are required in this phase within 10 days of the de-energization incident</li> </ul>

Phase 3A: Recovery (Demobilization Execution Checklist)	
Role	Responsibility
<b>Situational Awareness Center</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides 3-day weather outlook to the Watch Office <input type="checkbox"/> Resumes normal weather monitoring
<b>SCE Watch Office</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Sends Critical Incident Report <input type="checkbox"/> Includes status updates in the Daily Report
<b>IST Incident Commander (Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Informs the CMC of demobilization of the EOC <input type="checkbox"/> Formulates long-term strategy on recovery
<b>ES IMT Incident Commander (Deputy)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Facilitates a conference coordination call with the PSPS Task Force, Grid OPS Director and legal to validate that DEMOB criteria have been met and that DEMOB is appropriate. <input type="checkbox"/> Establishes triggers for re-activation of the ES IMT and communicate them to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Meteorology</li> <li>○ Watch Office</li> <li>○ BRDM</li> <li>○ DEMOB Plan</li> </ul>
<b>CMC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Deactivates based on information from the IC
<b>Operations Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Addresses long term repairs for damaged circuits in DEMOB plan <input type="checkbox"/> Demobilizes field observers and additional <input type="checkbox"/> Demobilizes mitigation resources <input type="checkbox"/> Communicates with Grid Operations Storm Manager on the status of SOB 322 procedures for DEMOB <input type="checkbox"/> Directs debris flow modeling activities if appropriate <input type="checkbox"/> Evaluate the ability to resume planned and emergent field work based on weather forecasts
<b>Claims Tech. Spec</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Gather, prioritize and report all identified claims to the Operations Section Chief <input type="checkbox"/> Formulate a long-range strategy for transitioning and managing ongoing related claims after demobilization
<b>PSPS Task Force (Grid Ops Lead)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides input to the Planning Section Chief for the Post-Event Report <input type="checkbox"/> Prepares all necessary compliance reporting per ESRB-8
<b>Planning Section Chief</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Creates DEMOB Plan <input type="checkbox"/> Completes Post-Event Report for CPUC or address gaps in DEMOB plan
<b>Liaison Officer</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Creates release schedule for any SCE AREPs at County EOCs <input type="checkbox"/> Notifies SCE offices in San Francisco/Sacramento/Washington, DC <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates with local government, public safety agencies and NGOs to demobilize SCE resources at community locations as appropriate
<b>Customer Service Tech Spec.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Follows up to ensure that all appropriate customer notifications were sent to customers during the event <input type="checkbox"/> Briefs appropriate staff and removes PSPS related messaging from the IVR at an appropriate time <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinates immediate and on-going customer outreach as appropriate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Vulnerable customers/Bill forgiveness/Local Assistance Center staffing/support/Directed Customer Communications and Claims Information</li> </ul>